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In the SupreDie Court of the
State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH, by and through its R01\D
COMMISSION; D. H. WHITTENBURG,
Chairman, and LAYTON MAXFIELD and
LORENZO J. BOTT, members of the State
Road Commission,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

\

vs.

I

CASE
NO. 8274

BOLEY, INCORPO'RATED, a corporation,

et al,
Defendants,
and
BOYD W. CALTO·N and MARY CALTON,
Intervenors and Respondents.

Brief of Intervenors and Respondents on
Intermediate Appeal
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because we do not believe the appellant's state~ment
of facts properly presents the intervenors' position in this
intermediate appeal, we shall restate them in the light of
the intervenors' theory of the case.
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The issue on this intermediate appeal is whether, when
the State of Utah actually takes property for a public use
in connection with a highway project, and brings eminent
domain proceedings against some of the property owners
along said project, a property. owner whose land is in fact
taken, though neither he nor the particular property is
named in the complaint, may properly intervene in that
action to have his constitutional right to just compensation
for the taking determined.
State Highway Project No. 1524 involved the widening of U.S. Highway No. 50--89-91, between the cities of
American Fork and Lehi, Utah. In connection with the
acquisition of rights of way for this project, the State of
Utah, on February 17, 1954, filed this action in the District
Court of Utah County to condemn certain parcels of land
along this right of way. These are shown on the Exhibits
to the complaint on file herein and on page 3 of the appellant's brief.
On July 21, 1954, the intervenors filed in this condemnation action a motion and plea in intervention wherein it
is alleged, among other things, that the intervenors hold a
leasehold estate in certain real property along this right of
way, that the intervenors were in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of this leasehold estate at the time
of the construction of this project and during the time of
this action, and that the State of Utah, in connection with
this road project, and without notice to the intervenors,
without opportWlity for them to be heard, and without due
process of law, entered upon a portion of this leasehold estate to the exclusion of the intervenors. The plea in intervention prays that the state be compelled to compensate
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the intervenors for the portion of the leasehold estate thus
taken and for damage to the remainder of that estate.
The trial court granted the intervenors' motion and

this Court allowed intermediate appeal by the state from
that order. For the purposes of this intermediate appeal,
we take it that the facts alleged in the plea in intervention
are assumed to be true.
The arguments in the state's brief fall logically in two:
first, that this is not a proper cause for intervention, and
second, that the intervenors are, under the authority of
Hjorth v. Whittenburg, et al. (1952),
Utah'-----241 P. 2d 907, limited in their choice of forums to the Board
of Examiners and the Legislature of the State of Utah. We
shall present our argument in these two divisions.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I: WHERE THE STATE, IN CONNECTION
WITH A ROAD CO·NSTRUUCTION PROJECT, BRINGS
AN EMII'JENT DO·MAIN ACTION AGAINST CERTAIN
PROPERTY OWNERS, THAT PERSON WHOSE PRO~P
ERTY HAS IN FACT BEEN TAKEN, TH!OUGH NEITHER HE NOR HIS PROPERTY HAS BE.EN NAMED
IN THE EMINENT DO·MAIN PROCEEDINGS, MAY
PR01PERLY INTERVENE IN THE ACTION TO HAVE
HIS DAMAGES FOR THE TAKING AND' CO-NSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES JUDICIALLY DETERMINED.
POINT II: A PROPERTY OWNER WHOSE PRO·PERTY HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE STATE O·F UTAH)
WITHOUT DUE PRO·CESS OF LAW, IS NOT LIMITED
TO ADMINISTRATIVE OR LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE THE STATE, IN CONNECTION WITH A
ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, BRINGS AN EMINENT' DOMAIN ACTION AGAINST CERTAIN PROPERTY OWNERS, THAT PERSON WHOSE PRO,PERTY
HAS IN FACf BEEN TAKEN, THOUGH NEITHER HE
NO~R·\, HliS- PROPERTY HAS' BEEN, NAMED. IN THE
EMINENT.. DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS, MAY PROPERLY
INTEVRENE IN, THE ACTIO-N· TO HAV1E DAMAGE8
FOR THE TAKING AND CONSE.QUENTIAL DAMAGES
JUDICIALLY DETERMINED.

It is urged. that nei~ther intervention of right nor permissive intervention lies in the case at bar. From our view
of intervenors' theory of. their. cause, this Court need not,
on the facts before it, decide whether intervention of right
is- available to.· intervenors. If we concede that the intervenors .were . admitted to the case. on discretion. of the trial
court, there was: no abuse of its discretion in so doing.
Rule· 24(b), URCP, provides in· part: "Upon timely·
application anyone· may be permitted· to intervene in an
action: * * *· * (2) when an applicant's claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact
in common *' * * *~'' This is one of the grounds for
permissive· intervention.
On pages 4-5 of its brief, the state sets forth the issues
of the case ru; being " (1) the public necessity of the taking;

value, of .property taken; and (3) severance damage."
Those:ar.eprecisely the. issues that.we~ in our poor way, are·
endeavoring to place before the trial court as respects the
( 2.)
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intervenors' estate in land. taken by the state~ It is urged
that the intervenors' claim would- have to be severed for
trial. We -confess that we thought that was the usual manner of trying. eminent domain cases involving highway projects. The last sentence of Section 78-34-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, would appear to contemplate this possibility,
and we note that-what is denominated the main case seemlS
to be a consolidated action against approximately six different defendants whose property, not necessarily adjacent
to each other's, is distributed over ·a linear distance something. in excess of two miles. We cannot refain from remarking that it would be interesting to observe the trial
of the main case in toto before a single jury.
On page 5 of the state's brief it is stated that the issues presented by the intervenors are "(1) whether· the
Road Commission's entry (upon intervenors' leasehold estate) was privileged and if not (2) what damage was done"
to it. We are at a loss to find where this matter of· "privileged" entry came in. Surely the Attorney General would
not urge that the state, taking possession of property for
a public use without bringing a condemnation action, acquires a "privilege"! On page 2 of'the state's brief it is alleged that the road commlssion acquired from the f~hol
der by deed the portion of land taken. Apart from the
fact that this is a gratuitous~ unsworn statement not subject to cross examination, it should be pleaded and proved
if it is considered·. as material. The facts- thus. stated are
certainly not beforethe Court on this-appeaL Inany·event,
a leasehold estate- is such an interest in land as to require
condemnation. Korf v. Fleming; (1948), 237 Iowa 501, 32
NW 2d 85, 3 ALR· 2d 270. An easement may be condemned
upon an easement. \Vhiterocks Irrigation Co. v. Moose-
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man et al., (1914) 45 Utah 79, 141 Pac. 459, and the statute
expressly provides that anyone having an interest in land
named in the complaint may appear and defend, whether
or not he is named in the complaint. 78-34-7, Utah Code
Annotated 1953.

Although neither the fee-holder nor the land involved
herein were named in the complaint, we respectfully subrmt
that intervenors are properly before the Court to determine
the questions of the taking of their property and their right
to just compensation. Other remedies were available to
the intervenors, but this matter will be considered under
the next point of argument.
POINT II
A PROPERTY OWNER WHOSE PR0 PERTY HAS
BEEN TAKEN BY THE STATE OF UTAH WITHOUT
DUE PROCESS OF LAW IS NOT LIMITED TO ADMINISTRATIVE OR LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES.
1

Upon oral argument of the mortion to intervene and
under Foint Til of the state's brief, the appeUant urges that
the intervenors are limited in seeking their remedy to pre-senting their cause to the Board of Examiners and the legIslature of this state. Appellant relies upon the case of
Hjorth v. Whittenburg, et al, supra, as their authority for
this proposition.
We respectfully sub1nit that that case is no such authority. In the Hjorth case, the property owner sought
consequential damages only, and from the members of the
road commission personally. The State of Utah was not
even a party. In the case at bar, the intervenors are seeking just comlpensation for propellty taken in addition to con-
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sequential damages, and they are seeking this remedy
against the State of Utah itself. The Hjorth case stands
for the proposition that where the members of the road
commission act in good faith and without negligence in exercising the authority of the State of Utah, they cannot be
held liable personally for damages caused by such action.
That rule of law has nothing to do with the case be:Eore
this Court. The intervenors are seeking in this action to
compel the state itself, not the members of its administrative body, to give them just compensation for property taken for public use. This right is guaranteed the intervenors by Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, and
the procedure whereby the interests of persons in the position of the intervenors are protected against the state
have been set forth in Chapter 34, Title '78, Utah Code Ann)otated 1953. The state, so far as intervenors are concerned, has complied with none of the provisions of this
legisiartive act. Strange indeed would he the rule of law
which permitted the State of Utah to benefit in any manner from its failure to abide by its organic act and legislation adopted pursuant thereto.
True, the state is a trespasser so far as intervenors
are concerned, but intervenors are not seeking relief for a
trespass. Intervenors do not attempt in this action to sue
the State of Utah in tort. They seek merely to compel the
State of Utah to condemn tbeir property according to due
process of law. We submit that the case of Campbell Building Company v. State Road Commission (1937), 95 Utah
242, 70 P. 2d, 857, is therefore also not applicable to the
case at the bar.
Certainly the intervenors could have chosen to present their claim to the Board of Examiners. They could
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have sought an injunction against the state and the members of the road commission upon commencement of the
project. They could have proceeded in court against the
contractor in trespass, and, on the theory of negligence, we
believe they could have proceeded against the members of
the road com~sion individually for acts of their agents,
under the authority of the Hjjorth case. Intervenors have
elected to compel the state to condemn their property. Unwise as this election may be, we submit that it lies with
the intervenors, not the state.
It is believed that intervenors could have proceeded
against the members of the road commission for a writ
of mandate to ·compel them to condemn their property interest. 34 A. J. 937, "Mandamus" Sec. 161. This also they
chosen not to do. This would, we submit, have been a wasteful and circuitous route to the same end sought through
intervention.
The nub of the state~s defense to this intervention is
this: it is endeavoring to hide behind sovereign immunity
to avoid paying just compensation. for property it has taken
by virtue of its sovereign power.

We do not believe intervenors' action sounds in tort.
Rather, it is brought to enforce a right given the~ by Article I, Section 22, Utah Constitution. It is our position
that this article is self-executing, and that if necessary, we
could have brought a separate action against the state to
enforce this right. Milhous v. State Highway Department,
(1940), 194 S. C. 33, 8 SE 2d 852, 128 ALR 1186.
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CONCLUSION
Upon this intermediate appeal the state has not raised
two questions of law that are inherent in this action; whether a leasehold interest is sufficient interest in land to be the
subject matter of condemnation, and ·whether, if this
be so, possession under an unrecorded lease is sufficient
notice to the state to avoid the effect of the recording statute. On this lastter issue, we respectfully submit that there
is no reason for holding that the state is not bound by the
general rule announced in Toland v. Corey (1890) 6 Utah
392, 24 Pac. 190. Should this Court uphold the ruling of
the trial court now before it for review, then, in order to
avoid multiplicity of appeals, these issues ought to be disposed of.
We further respectfully submit that the state, in its
exercise of sovereign power to take a ·citizen's property for
a public use, is not immune from suit to determine the ·matter of just compensation for such taking.
Respectfully submitted,
HEBER GRANT IVINS
ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Attorneys for Intervenors
and Respondents
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